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I then argue that we have good reason to 
think that all beliefs can motivate a particular 
action without the assistance of a conceptually 
independent desire (Bromwich 2010: 344). 
Bromwich’s theory of belief clashes head-
on with Michael A. Smith’s theory of belief 
(1994). Smith claims that a belief alone does 
not motivate an action and that both a belief 
and a desire are required to explain an action. 
The aim of this paper is to refute Bromwich’s 
arguments for the view that a belief is motiva-
tionally efficacious and to defend the Humean 
view that a belief is motivationally inert. I will 
show that a belief does not have a disposi-
tional property. 
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Danielle Bromwich (2010) argues that a belief is motivationally efficacious in that, other things being equal, 
it disposes an agent to answer a question in accordance with that belief. I reply that what we are disposed 
to do is largely determined by our genes, whereas what we believe is largely determined by stimuli from the 
environment. We have a standing and default disposition to answer questions honestly, ceteris paribus, even 
before we are exposed to environmental stimuli. Since this standing and default disposition is innate, and 
our beliefs have their source in environmental stimuli, our beliefs cannot be the source of the disposition. 
Moreover, a recent finding in neuroscience suggests that motivation is extrinsic to belief. 
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Introduction
In folk psychology, a belief and a desire are 
often jointly used to explain human behavior. 
For example, I am drinking water because I 
believe that drinking water quenches thirst, 
and because I have the desire to quench my 
thirst. A belief is a cognitive state that repre-
sents a state of affairs in the world. It is capable 
of being true or false. In contrast, a desire is 
a conative state that motivates an action. It is 
incapable of being true or false. Bromwich ad-
vances a novel thesis that all beliefs, moral or 
non-moral, are capable of motivating actions 
as well as representing facts: 
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Bromwich versus the Humean
Let me begin with Bromwich’s example, which 
is useful in exhibiting the differences between 
her theory of belief and the Humean theory of 
belief: 
Consider David. He believes that “The knives 
and forks are on the table” and so when Carole 
asks him “Are the knives and forks on the table?” 
he replies “Yes”. Now imagine that David has 
this belief, is asked the same question by Carole, 
but does not answer at all. Can we make sense of 
David having the belief in question? Only, I think, 
in a situation where things are not otherwise equ-
al. David may want, for instance, to give Carole 
the “silent treatment”. His belief disposes him to 
answer “Yes” but this disposition is defeated by a 
competing disposition arising from his desire. But, 
if all things are equal, and Carole asks him “Are 
the knives and forks on the table?” what could 
prevent David from answering this question in 
the affirmative? (2010: 351).
David says yes to Carole’s question “Are the 
knives and forks on the table?”. Why does he say 
so? Bromwich and the Humean have different 
explanations. On Bromwich’s account, David 
says so, because he believes that the knives and 
forks are on the table, and “the belief alone 
explains the action” (2010: 352). The desire 
to say so need not be invoked to explain why 
he says so because the belief is motivationally 
efficacious enough to produce the action of 
answering the question affirmatively. Thus, 
Bromwich’s theory of belief can be summarized 
by what she calls the minimal thesis:
The minimal thesis: A subject S believes that 
p only if, if S were asked if it is the case that p, S 
would respond in the affirmative, all other things 
being equal (Bromwich 2010: 351).
If a subject believes that p, then, ceteris 
paribus, he would say “Yes” to the question: 
Is it the case that p? If he does not say so, it 
is hard to attribute to him the belief that p. A 
belief is motivationally efficacious in the sense 
that it disposes an agent to answer a question in 
accordance with it.
On the Humean account, in contrast, David 
says yes to Carole’s question, because he believes 
that the knives and forks are on the table and 
because he desires to say so. The belief is moti-
vationally inert, so it alone cannot bring about 
the action of answering the question. The belief 
needs a motivational backup from the desire to 
answer honestly. The Humean can add that the 
desire to answer honestly is a standing desire, 
i.e., it is a desire that we always have. Also, it is 
a default desire, i.e., if there is no special reason 
not to be truthful in a particular situation, we 
have the desire to answer honestly. This default 
desire is independent of a belief. 
Suppose that David does not answer Carole’s 
question when he believes that the knives and 
forks are on the table. Why doesn’t he an-
swer her question? Again, Bromwich and the 
Humean have competing explanations: 
The Humean argues that although David has 
the belief in question, David also has a desire that 
directs him not to answer the question in the af-
firmative; a desire, say, to give Carole the “silent 
treatment”. The minimal theorist can agree – but, 
the minimal theorist will argue, David’s belief still 
disposes him to answer the question in the affir-
mative; David just fails to act on this disposition 
because it is defeated by the desire (Bromwich 
2010: 352).  
According to Bromwich, David believes 
that the knives and forks are on the table, so he 
is disposed to answer Carole’s question in the 
affirmative. But he does not answer it because 
his disposition is defeated by another mental 
state. Perhaps, he harbors anger toward her. 
In his mind, there was a conflict between the 
belief and the anger, and the anger vanquished 
the belief. As a result, he does not answer her 
question. 
According to the Humean, on the other 
hand, a belief is motivationally inert, so David’s 
belief cannot dispose him to answer Carole’s 
question affirmatively. He instead has the stand-
ing desire to respond honestly to questions from 
others. But the default desire is overridden by 
his anger toward her. As a result, he does not 
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answer her question. Both his default desire 
and his anger toward her are independent of 
his belief that the knives and the forks are on 
the table. The belief, since it lacks motivational 
force, did not participate in the battle between 
the standing desire and the anger. 
As sketched above, Bromwich and the 
Humean have competing explanations as to 
why David answers or fails to answer Carole’s 
question. As Bromwich notes herself, she and 
the Humean have different burdens of proof: 
The Humean needs to show that David’s af-
firmative answer is motivated by a conceptually 
independent desire that is neither entailed by 
the presence of, nor partially constitutive of, any 
belief (Bromwich 2010: 354).
In contrast, Bromwich needs to show that 
David’s act of answering affirmatively is moti-
vated by the disposition inherent in his belief, 
not by another mental state external to the 
belief. In the following sections, I will criticize 
Bromwich’s position and defend the Humean 
position. 
no necessary connection
Smith (1994), a proponent of the Humean 
theory of motivation, argues that motivation 
is not constitutive of belief because in certain 
circumstances, motivation is obliterated while 
belief remains unscathed. For example, depres-
sions “can leave someone’s evaluative outlook 
intact while removing their motivations al-
together” (Smith 1994: 120–121). Thus, if an 
agent is motivated to do anything at all when 
he believes something, his motivation stemmed 
not from his belief but from some other source.
Bromwich replies that Smith’s contention is 
at variance with scientific literature on clinical 
depression according to which depression im-
pairs not only motivation but also belief: 
Many studies reveal that depressives are cog-
nitively impaired: their depressive episodes are 
accompanied by irrational thoughts and a ten-
dency to perceive themselves, their surrounding 
and their future in an unwarrantedly negative 
light (Bromwich 2010: 348). 
Psychological studies suggest that motiva-
tional impairment is necessarily accompanied 
by cognitive impairment. It is impossible to 
remove motivation without destroying belief. 
Therefore, motivation is constitutive of belief.
In my view, the scientif ic literature 
Bromwich cites does not establish that motiva-
tion is an essential ingredient of belief. In order 
for motivation to be constitutive of belief, mo-
tivation and belief should not be separated in 
all possible worlds. What the scientific finding 
displays is at best that they cannot be pulled 
apart in the nearby possible worlds where ob-
jects abide by the laws of nature. Motivation is 
not constitutive of belief as long as they come 
apart in a remote possible world where the 
laws of nature break down. In other words, 
it is metaphysical necessity, not nomological 
necessity, which is required to refute Smith’s 
contention that motivation is not constitutive 
of belief. The scientific literature exhibits at 
best the nomologically necessary connection 
between motivation and belief. 
Moreover, Smith’s contention can be bol-
stered by a different example. Imagine that 
David becomes lethargic as a result of smoking 
a potent form of marijuana over a long period 
of time. He does not take a walk even on a 
beautiful day, always staying in his apartment 
alone. He does not even want to speak with 
anyone. One day, Carol visits his apartment 
and puts knives and forks on the table. At that 
moment, David’s visual faculty works flaw-
lessly. Accordingly, he believes that the knives 
and forks are on the table. Carol asks whether 
the knives and forks are on the table. Silence 
ensues. In this situation, David does not answer 
her question not because another motivation 
obstructed the motivation to respond but 
because he does not have the motivation to 
answer her question in the first place. Recall 
that being lethargic, he does not even want to 
speak with anyone. It does not matter whether 
the laws of nature allow such an agent to exist 
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or not in this world. What is important is that 
we can conceive of such an agent, and as long as 
such an agent exists in a remote possible world, 
Smith’s point is established that motivation is 
not constitutive of belief. 
Interestingly, recent research in neuroscience 
suggests that there is not even a nomologically 
necessary connection between belief and moti-
vation. Some neuroscientists recently discovered 
that a neural system in a rat’s brain is responsible 
for selecting a single action from multiple alter-
natives. Signals arise in a region of the rat’s brain 
called the rostral part of medial agranular cortex 
(AGm), when the rat makes a decision on what 
action to choose among multiple alternatives 
associated with different values: 
Our results indicate the involvement of the 
rostral AGm not only in action selection but also 
in valuation, which is consistent with the find-
ing that AGm activity is modulated by expected 
reward (see Hoon Sul et al. 2011).
Their research on the rat’s brain suggests 
that there might be a particular region of the 
human brain that is also responsible for the de-
cision on what action to choose among different 
alternatives. For example, signals arise in that 
region of our brain when we decide to major in 
philosophy as opposed to English, but signals 
do not arise when we form the belief that a tri-
angle is three-sided as opposed to two-sided. In 
short, it is likely that there is a neural difference 
between our decision on what to believe and 
our decision on what to do.
The neural difference goes hand in hand 
with the Humean view that a belief is motiva-
tionally inert, but not with Bromwich’s view 
that a belief is motivationally efficacious. For 
the Humean, motivation is involved when 
we decide to do something, but not when we 
decide to believe something. Therefore, it is 
natural that neural signals pertaining to moti-
vation arise when we decide to do something 
but not when we decide to believe something. 
For Bromwich, however, a belief is motiva-
tionally potent, so motivation is involved in 
both the decision on what to believe and the 
decision on what to do. Therefore, Bromwich’s 
position cannot explain why the neural differ-
ence exists. 
against weak dispositionalism
Bromwich’s position, the minimal thesis, 
originates from what she calls weak disposi-
tionalism according to which a belief disposes 
an agent to act in a certain way. A successful 
defense of the Humean view that a belief is 
motivationally impotent requires the refuta-
tion of the argument for weak dispositional-
ism. In this section, I criticize the argument 
for weak dispositionalism, which Bromwich 
states as follows: 
Weak dispositionalism: All beliefs have dis-
positional properties. Weak dispositionalism is 
widely accepted due to the fact that it is hard to 
make sense of an agent believing that p but fail-
ing to act, think, feel or expect as if it is the case 
that p, at least when all other things are equal 
(Bromwich 2010: 349).
The following accept weak dispositionalism: 
H. H. Price (1969), Willard Van Orman Quine 
(1960), Gilbert Ryle (1949), R. B. Braithwaite 
(1933), Ruth Barcan Marcus (1990), Laurence 
Jonathan Cohen (1992), Eric Schwitzgebel 
(2001, 2002), Robert Stalnaker (1984), Frank P. 
Ramsey (1931), Daniel Dennett (1978), Charles 
Travis (2003), Robert N. Audi (1994) and Lynne 
Rudder Baker (1995) (see Bromwich 2010: 349, 
footnote). 
As her footnote above indicates, Bromwich 
is in good company. Many eminent philoso-
phers are attracted to the idea that a belief alone 
has the power to motivate an action. They 
would endorse Bromwich’s minimal thesis for 
the reason that it is hard to account for an agent 
believing that p but failing to act as if it is the 
case that p, ceteris paribus.
From the Humean point of view, however, 
it is not hard to account for an agent who acts 
contrary to his belief. Such an action can be 
explained in terms of a special desire overriding 
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the standing desire to act in accordance with 
one’s belief. For example, imagine that an agent 
believes that the earth is round. When asked 
whether the earth is round or flat, however, 
he says, “The earth is flat”. Why does he speak 
contrary to his belief? It might be that he is 
under a political pressure to speak as if he 
believes that the earth is flat, or that a million 
dollars is offered to him on the condition that 
he acts contrary to his belief. The desire to 
avoid the political persecution or the desire to 
earn the money overturned the standing desire 
to answer honestly. This Humean explanation 
undermines the argument for weak disposi-
tionalism embraced by the many prominent 
philosophers above.
Standing desire
Recall that the Humean posits the existence 
of the default desire to answer questions as we 
believe, and that the default desire is indepen-
dent of any belief. Bromwich argues that the 
Humean assumption is illegitimate because it 
is not true of all human beings. It is implausible 
that three-year-old children have such a sophis-
ticated desire:
It seems implausible to assume that children 
have a standing desire to be cooperative conver-
sational partners. Imagine chatting with a three 
year old. Perhaps you ask the child “Is that jam 
on your hands?” and the child in question re-
sponds in the affirmative. Is it plausible to assume 
that this three year old has a standing desire to 
be a cooperative conversational partner or even 
a standing desire to play a cooperative conversa-
tional game? Clearly not – it is psychologically 
implausible to suppose that a three year old could 
have desires with such sophisticated content. And, 
notice, even if the content is simpler – say, a de-
sire to be honest – it is not clear that very young 
children have yet fully grasped concepts such as 
honesty. It is far from clear, then, that we can at-
tribute such standing desires to all human beings 
(Bromwich 2010: 355). 
Note that for Bromwich, it is implausible 
that three-year-old children have the standing 
desire to be cooperative conversational partners 
or to be honest because it is not clear that they 
can have desires with such sophisticated con-
tent, and because it is not clear that they have 
grasped the concepts of being a cooperative 
conversational partner or of honesty. 
In my view, Bromwich’s argument that 
three-year-olds cannot have the desire to be 
honest because they have not yet grasped the 
concept of honesty is invalid. We can think 
without understanding what it is to think. 
Grasping the concept of thinking is not needed 
in order to think. Similarly, children can have 
a standing desire to answer honestly without 
understanding what it is to answer honestly. 
To put it another way, grasping the concept 
of honesty is not required in order to have the 
desire to answer honestly. In general, we do not 
need a second-order mental state in order to 
have a first-order mental state. After all, if we 
need the second-order mental state in order 
to have a first-order mental state, we would 
also need a third-order mental state in order 
to have the second-order mental state, and we 
would not even be able to have the first-order 
mental state due to the problem of infinite re-
gress. In short, three-year-olds may not know 
what it is to be cooperative conversational 
partners. It does not follow, however, that 
they do not have the desire to be cooperative 
conversational partners.
How about Bromwich’s argument that three-
year-olds cannot have the standing desire to be 
cooperative conversational partners because it 
is too sophisticated for them? An evolutionary 
consideration speaks against her argument. 
Some evolutionary psychologists maintain that 
a sense of morality has evolved by natural selec-
tion. It was selected for in the past because it 
promoted cooperation between individuals, and 
because the cooperation increased the chance of 
propagating individuals’ genes: 
The constellation of thoughts and feelings that 
constitute a sense of morality evolved to enable 
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individuals to uphold cooperative social relations 
that maximized their biological benefits (Krebs 
2008: 168). 
The sense of cooperation is in our genes. It 
is a heritable characteristic that has been trans-
mitted to us from our ancestors. Cooperation is 
hard to come by without the honest exchange of 
information between individuals. To exchange 
information honestly is to be a cooperative con-
versational partner. Therefore, it is plausible that 
three-year-olds have a sophisticated desire to 
be cooperative conversational partners, contra 
Bromwich.
Suppose that Bromwich is right that three-
year-olds cannot have the desire to be coop-
erative conversational partners because it is 
too sophisticated for them. Then, this criticism 
against the Humean theory of belief backfires 
on Bromwich’s own theory of belief. Recall that 
her minimal thesis holds that to believe that p 
involves to be disposed to answer affirmatively 
the question: Is it the case that p? The disposi-
tion to answer the question in that manner is 
more sophisticated than the desire to be co-
operative conversational partners. Therefore, 
three-year-olds cannot believe, for example, that 
an apple is red.
Cognitive dissonance
Bromwich claims that “the literature on cogni-
tive dissonance gives us reason to favor the 
minimal thesis over the Humean theory of 
motivation” (2010: 360). Recall that the minimal 
thesis holds that if a subject believes that p, he 
would say yes ceteris paribus to the question: 
Is it the case that p? In order to evaluate her 
assertion, we need to know what psychologists 
say about cognitive dissonance. Leon Festinger 
and James M. Carlsmith, whom Bromwich cites, 
ask an interesting question: What will happen 
to “a person’s private opinion if he is forced to 
do or say something contrary to that opinion?” 
(Festinger, Carlsmith 1959: 203). Suppose, for 
example, that you performed a repetitive and 
tedious task. As a result, you believe that the 
task was boring and monotonous. But you are 
offered a certain amount of money and asked 
to say to others that the task was interesting. 
Consequently, you say to them that the task 
was enjoyable. You said something contrary to 
your belief. In such a situation, Festinger and 
Carlsmith note, you suffer from cognitive dis-
sonance, a kind of psychological discomfort, 
and then replace your previous belief with a 
new belief that accords with what you said or 
did. Your new belief in the above case is that 
the task was really interesting. As a result, 
cognitive dissonance is resolved and cognitive 
consonance returns.
Why does acting contrary to one’s belief 
cause cognitive dissonance? Bromwich’s expla-
nation is that “acting contrary to one’s belief 
causes cognitive dissonance because to believe 
that p is to be disposed to act as if it is the case 
that p <…>” (2010: 360). The idea seems to be 
that cognitive dissonance originates from the 
conflict between what your belief disposes you 
to do and what you actually do. The clash be-
tween the belief and the action gives rise to the 
cognitive dissonance and then to the revision 
of the previous belief. You thereby form a new 
belief and regain cognitive consonance. Notice 
that for Bromwich, cognitive dissonance arises 
because of the conflict between the old belief 
and the action.
It seems to me, however, that the Humean 
has an alternative explanation of cognitive 
dissonance, and that it is at least as plausible 
as Bromwich’s. We have a standing desire to 
speak and act in accordance with our belief. 
Cognitive dissonance arises when there is 
a collision between the standing desire and 
a special desire that we have in a particular 
situation. The special desire in the above case 
is the desire to make money in return for say-
ing that the task was interesting. The clash 
between the standing desire and the special 
desire leads to the revision of the previous 
belief. When the belief is revised, cognitive 
consonance is restored. Note that the old 
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belief is replaced with the new belief not be-
cause of the conflict between the old belief and 
the action but because of the conflict between 
the standing desire and the special desire. The 
standing desire and the special desire are both 
independent of the old belief and the new 
belief. Therefore, Festinger’s and Carlsmith’s 
cognitive dissonance theory in psychology 
does not favor Bromwich’s theory of belief 
over the Humean theory of belief, contrary to 
what Bromwich claims.
Vacuity
Recall that for Bromwich, David says yes to 
Carole’s question because he believes that 
the knives and forks are on the table, i.e., he 
is disposed to act as if it is the case that the 
knives and forks are on the table. The belief 
is motivationally efficacious, so it by itself can 
generate the action of answering the question. 
In consequence, the desire to answer the ques-
tion honestly is not needed to explain why 
David answers it affirmatively. Notice that in 
Bromwich’s explanation of David’s verbal behav-
ior, the explanans is the disposition to answer 
affirmatively, and the explanandum is the act of 
answering affirmatively. Thus, her explanation 
has the form: An agent does X because he is 
disposed to do X.
A problem with Bromwich’s explanatory 
scheme is that any action can be explained in 
that manner. For instance, David is sleeping 
now because he is disposed to sleep. The glasses 
break into pieces because they are disposed to 
break into pieces. These explanations are almost 
vacuous, casting no interesting light on why the 
phenomena occurred. Likewise, Bromwich’s 
explanation is also almost vacuous that David 
answers Carole’s question affirmatively because 
he is disposed to speak as if it is the case that 
the knives and forks are on the table. It does 
not shed new light on why David answers in an 
affirmative manner. Such an explanation verges 
on triviality. 
Third factor
There is another problem with Bromwich’s 
contention that “the belief alone explains the 
action” (2010: 352). In general, a disposition 
cannot generate an action alone. A third factor 
is needed for the disposition to bring about 
the action. For example, in addition to being 
disposed to break into pieces, the glasses need 
to be dropped to the ground from a high place 
in order to break into pieces. The disposition 
of the glasses alone cannot generate the event 
of the glasses’ breaking into pieces. Similarly, 
being disposed to answer a question honestly 
alone cannot generate the action of answering 
a question honestly, i.e. a belief alone cannot 
generate an action, so the belief alone cannot 
explain the action. Hence, the explanation of 
an action invoking only a belief is incomplete. 
Bromwich might reply that an agent answers 
a question honestly because his belief disposed 
him to do so, and he was asked the question. 
Being asked the question is the third factor that 
contributed to the generation of the answering 
act. A problem with this move is that it is sad-
dled with the assumption that being asked the 
question does not cause a mental state which 
in turn activates the disposition of the belief. 
Once Bromwich invokes the mental state, she 
has to give up her previous contention that a 
belief alone is enough to motivate an action, and 
she opens the door to the Humean view that a 
desire needs to be invoked in addition to a belief 
to explain an action. 
Independence
In this section, I argue that the disposition 
to answer honestly is separate from belief. 
Consider that we are genetically disposed to feel 
that snakes are repulsive. We have the standing 
disposition to shy away from a snake, although 
we have never seen one before. The disposition 
is manifested when we see a snake. Thus, the 
disposition stemmed not from the belief but 
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from our genes. An evolutionary story can be 
given of why we have the innate disposition to 
stay away from a snake. Our ancestors acquired 
the disposition after a series of variations in the 
distant past. The disposition was advantageous 
for their survival and reproduction, especially 
in forests. Given that some snakes were poi-
sonous, individuals with the disposition were 
more likely to enjoy longevity and fecundity 
than those without. Eventually, the disposition 
became genetically encoded in our ancestors. 
As a result, it is innate in us now. The innate 
disposition is defeasible. It can be obstructed 
by a stronger opposing motive in a particular 
situation. For example, we may not step back 
from a snake, once we are told that the snake is 
not poisonous and that we will be given a mil-
lion dollars provided that we do not step back.
Analogously, we are genetically wired to 
answer honestly when we are asked questions. 
An evolutionary explanation can also be given 
of why we have this innate disposition. Our an-
cestors acquired the disposition due to a series 
of variations in the distant past. It raised the 
viability and fertility of our ancestors. Imagine 
a society where individuals have the default dis-
position to answer honestly and another society 
where individuals have the default disposition 
not to answer at all or to answer dishonestly. 
It is clear that the first society has the better 
chance to perpetuate itself than the second. 
After all, where there is no honest exchange of 
information, there is no cooperation and, hence, 
no prosperity. In short, the genes responsible 
for the default disposition enhanced the fitness 
of our ancestors, and we inherited the innate 
disposition from our ancestors. The innate dis-
position exists temporally prior to, hence inde-
pendently of, any belief that we acquire after we 
are born. Like the disposition to step back from 
a snake, the disposition to answer honestly is 
defeasible. It can be overridden by a more force-
ful, opposite reason in a particular situation. 
For example, we may not answer a question as 
we believe if we are angry at our questioner. In 
any event, the disposition to answer honestly is 
extrinsic to any belief we form after we are born, 
pace Bromwich.
The foregoing evolutionary story suggests 
that dispositions in general originate by and 
large from genes, whereas beliefs originate by 
and large from the environment. Let me bolster 
this idea with the following considerations. 
First, it is a fact of our daily life that different 
people exhibit different behavioral dispositions 
but converge on the same belief, when they are 
exposed to the same stimulus. For example, 
David and Carole see a beautiful woman on the 
street. They have the same belief that a beautiful 
woman is in front of them, but they have differ-
ent dispositions: David is disposed to flirt with 
her, while Carole is disposed to guard against 
her. They have these different dispositions 
because they have different genetic properties. 
Second, we may have different dispositions, 
but we typically possess the same belief at dif-
ferent stages of our life. For instance, when 
children and adults are listening to a fairy 
tale, they have the same belief that they are 
listening to the fairy tale, but they have dif-
ferent dispositions. The children are disposed 
to continue to listen to it, but the adults are 
disposed to do something else, e.g., reproduc-
ing. Why do they have different dispositions? 
Genes programmed human beings to have 
different dispositions at different stages of life. 
Consequentially, children have a predilection 
for fairy tales, and adults for reproduction-
related activities. Thus, what we are disposed 
to do is largely determined by our genes, 
whereas what we believe is largely determined 
by stimuli from the environment. 
Third, dispositions are hereditary traits that 
can be passed from one generation to the next, 
but beliefs are not. My father has the cognitive 
disposition to make an inference from one be-
lief to another and the phenomenal disposition 
to be surprised when his belief is disconfirmed. 
I inherited those dispositions from him. In 
contrast, he believes that his mother was great, 
but I do not. He and I have similar dispositions, 
because we are genetically similar, but we have 
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different beliefs, because we were exposed to 
different stimuli. Thus, genes are largely re-
sponsible for dispositions, whereas stimuli are 
largely responsible for beliefs. It follows that if 
you want to know what others are disposed to 
do, it is useful to investigate what their parents 
were disposed to do. In contrast, if you want to 
know what others believe, it is useful to investi-
gate what stimuli they were exposed to.
Finally, the Humean theory of belief can 
neatly account for our belief-forming pro-
cesses, but Bromwich’s theory of belief cannot. 
Bromwich’s theory holds that the disposition 
to answer honestly is inherent in a belief. Thus, 
the content of the belief that the earth is round 
embeds the dispositional content “Reply af-
firmatively to the question: Is it the case that 
the earth is round?”. This suggestion, however, 
does not match up with what goes on in sci-
ence classes. No teacher says to his students 
“The earth is round. Answer affirmatively to 
the question: Is it the case that the earth is 
round?” in order to help his students to form 
the belief that the earth is round. Teachers only 
say to their students that “The earth is round”. 
The Humean explanation of what goes on in 
the science classes is that students have the 
innate disposition to answer honestly, so it is 
superfluous to add “Answer affirmatively to the 
question: Is it the case that the earth is round?”.
Conclusions
What we are disposed to do is largely deter-
mined by our genes, whereas what we believe is 
largely determined by stimuli from the environ-
ment. The standing disposition to answer ques-
tions honestly ceteris paribus is innate like other 
dispositions, such as the behavioral disposition 
to shy away from a snake, the cognitive disposi-
tion to make inferences, and the phenomenal 
disposition to be surprised. We genetically 
inherited these dispositions from our ancestors. 
In contrast, we acquire beliefs from the environ-
ment, and we cannot genetically convey beliefs 
to future generations. Since dispositions and 
beliefs have different origins and incompatible 
properties, they are separate mental properties, 
contrary to what many philosophers assert in 
the meta-ethics literature. Besides, the neural 
findings pertaining to the rat’s brain support 
the Humean view that motivation is extrinsic 
to belief. 
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PRIeŠ MOtYVaCInĮ ĮSItIkInIMŲ eFektYVUMĄ
Seungbae PaRk
Danielle Bromwich (2010) teigia, kad įsitikinimas yra motyvaciškai efektyvus, nes, kitiems dalykams esant 
lygiems, jis daro įtaką tam, kad į klausimą būtų atsakyta, atsižvelgiant į tą įsitikinimą. Mano atsakymas toks: 
mūsų veiksmus iš esmės nulemia mūsų genai; savo ruožtu tai, kuo esame įsitikinę, stipriai veikia aplinkos 
stimulai. Mes nuolat standartiškai linkstame atsakyti į klausimus sąžiningai, ceteris paribus, dar net nepatyrę 
aplinkos stimulų poveikio. Kadangi šis polinkis yra įgimtas, o savo įsitikinimus grindžiame aplinkos stimulais, 
mūsų įsitikinimai negali būti šio polinkio šaltinis. Be to, naujausi atradimai tyrinėjant neuronus rodo, kad 
motyvacija įsitikinimams yra neesminė. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: įsitikinimai, troškimai, polinkis, evoliucija, motyvacija.
